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Special Contribution
Georgia's Safe Harbor Ruling for
Affirmative Defenses in Criminal
Cases Should Be Revisited
by Judge Ben W. Studdard*
and Michael A. Arndt**
The State has the entire burden of proving the defendant's guilt of the
offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, reads the instruction given
to every jury empaneled to try a criminal case in Georgia.I The defendant
has no burden of proof at all. Where the evidence raises a defense, the
burden remains with the State to negate or disprove that defense beyond
a reasonable doubt. 2 But those same Georgia citizens, when summoned
to federal jury service, may hear a very different instruction: that the
defendant, upon raising an affirmative defense, has the burden of proof
as to that defense, by a preponderance of the evidence. 3
What explains the distinction? This Article aims for a complete, concise history of the issue in hopes of prompting the Georgia Supreme Court
* Chief Judge, State Court of Henry County. Mercer University (B.A., 1982); Mercer
University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1984).
** Staff Attorney to Chief Judge Ben Studdard, State Court of Henry County. University of Georgia (A.B., 2007); Georgia State University (M.A., 2009); Georgia State University (J.D., 2014). This Article is dedicated to my new daughter Railey with the hope that
she repays the favor after exploring a world full of interesting ideas.
1. SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION, VOL. II: CRIMINAL CASES, 1.20.10 (4th ed.
2007).
2. Id. at 3.00.00.
3. See, e.g., Eleventh Circuit District Judges Association Pattern Jury Instructions
Committee, Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal Cases 81 (2010) (stating that "to excuse a
criminal act, the Defendant must prove [an affirmative defense] by a preponderance of the
evidence" or clear and convincing evidence, depending on the specific affirmative defense).

35

MERCER LAW REVIEW

36

[Vol. 68

to remove our jurisprudence from a safe harbor that has long lost its utility.,
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part One looks to Blackstone's rule
that the criminal defendant always bears the burden of affirmative defenses. Though simple and clear, Blackstone's rule cannot be thoughtlessly transplanted to modern times because the two systems of criminal
law are fundamentally different. Part Two looks at insanity, the original
caveat to Blackstone's clear-cut rule. Insanity is the most prominent affirmative defense and, generally, is an area of law unto itself. When considering insanity, the United States Supreme Court opened the door for
other affirmative defense challenges, which came in the 1970s. During
this time of uncertainty, in State v. Moore,4 Georgia adopted the safest
course by requiring the State to disprove all affirmative defenses. Finally, in Part Three, we explain how federal law quickly resolved the uncertainty by providing that defendants could bear the burden of persuasion for affirmative defenses that did not involve the elements of an
offense. We provide examples of how other states have dealt with the issue and show that Georgia is in the minority of states. We conclude by
urging the Georgia Supreme Court, when presented with the issue, to
justify our continued adherence to Moore or replace it with a rule that is
easy to administer, comports with modern notions of due process, and
promotes just outcomes.
I. BLACKSTONE'S HIGHLY ADMINISTRABLE CATEGORICAL RULE
During colonial times and early union days, the common law of England had but a few mouthpieces. Of this fairly selective fraternity, none
is better known than William Blackstone. 5 It comes as little surprise,
then, that arguments in legal history often begin and end with a pithy
statement from Blackstone. And it is so here: cases considering the burden of persuasion in criminal cases rarely fail to include a citation to
Blackstone.6 Blackstone explained the rule that affirmative defenses
were matters for the defendant to prove. 7

4. 237 Ga. 269, 227 S.E.2d 241 (1976).
5. See, e.g., Emily Kadens, Justice Blackstone's Common Law Orthodoxy, 103 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1553, 1557 (2009).
6. E.g., Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714, 720 (2013); Dixon v. United States,
548 U.S. 1, 8 (2006).
7.

4 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 201 (1769).
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The simple rule, that defendants must prove all affirmative defenses,
is a product of the time. As such, we should exercise caution before trans8
planting the rule without first considering the surrounding context. For
example, Blackstone's simple answer cites a single case for the proposition. The case, at the special verdict stage, relies on logic that has since
been found to be at odds with our Due Process Clause 9 and might refer
to the burden of production (rather than the burden of persuasion).
Both Blackstone and his predecessor in commentary, Sir Michael Fos10
ter (judge and author of the influential Crown Law), cite only Oneby's
11
Case for the proposition that the defendant should bear the burden.12
In that case, the parties reached the King's Bench on a special verdict,
meaning the facts had been established and malice was the only question
remaining. If found, the defendant would be guilty of murder; if not
found, defendant would only be guilty of manslaughter. 1 3 The King's
Bench determined it was murder with the following logic: "if A kills B
and no sudden quarrel appears, it is murder, for it lies upon the party
indicted, to prove the sudden quarrel."1 4 Perhaps better, the defendant's
8. The proper use of history is, of course, a perennial question. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH
NIETZSCHE, THE USES AND ABUSES OF HISTORY 3 (2005) ("We do need history, but quite
differently from the jaded idlers in the garden of knowledge, however grandly they may
look down on our rude and unpicturesque requirements. In other words, we need it for life
and action. . ."). Given the importance of the common law and ever-increasing importance
of original meanings in the Constitution, lawyers frequently argue from history and, just
as frequently, they are criticized for being poor historians. See, e.g., Alfred H. Kelly, Clio
and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 S. CT. REV. 119, 155 (1965) ("The [Supreme]
Court, in performing its self-assumed role as constitutional historian has been, if not a naked king, no better than a very ragged one."); John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 193, 223 (1993) ("It is an open question, even when judges employ the past in
a good-faith effort toward neutral judgment, whether they can, in fact, select by some historical method data that will safely guide them to conclusions not predetermined by personal choice."). Though we will probably never agree on the proper use of history, we should
be skeptical when the answer to any question of interest comes from centuries ago without
any explanation of the intervening years.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from
the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17 n.48 (1983) (describing Foster's Crown Law as
a transition piece between a legal treatise and reporter).
11. The King v. Oneby (1727) 92 Eng. Rep. 465; 2 Ld. Raym 1485.
12. George P. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-ofPersuasionPracticesin Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 902-03 (1968). Oneby tends to be
the most cited, but there were several older cases, similarly situated, that stand for the
same principle. See, e.g., Member of the Philadelphia Bar, Dr. Webster's Trial, and His
Judge, I OLWINE'S L.J. 20 (1850).
13. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 902 (discussing Oneby, 92 Eng. Rep. at 465-67; 2 Ld.
Raym at 1485-87).
14. Id. (quoting Oneby, 92 Eng. Rep. at 466; 2 Ld. Raym at 1493).
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silence on the question of malice effectively established it and he was
convicted of murder. 15 Taking this ruling-where the Court decided
which crime was most appropriate for a party already found to be guilty
of something-and applying it to all criminal cases at the fact-finding
phase is, at minimum, an extension that should be justified by argument
rather than simply accepted as proper homage to our wiser forebears.
The difficulty with any such argument is the Supreme Court has since
ruled a presumption of malice unconstitutional.16 Oneby's ruling, effectively shifting the burden of proof on the element of malice, was found to
be at odds with our Due Process Clause.' 7
Along the same lines, burden shifting was less odious in England because its criminal law was quite a bit like its civil law. English criminal
law's "principal distinctive peculiarity, [is] the degree to which a criminal
trial resembles a private litigation."18 In common law England, private
citizens, not prosecutors, tried criminal cases.19 With this power came
control and responsibility: "A private person could manage his whole
prosecution just as he would manage a civil case. If one chose to prosecute, then one bore the cost of the proceedings." 20 The system was thus
one-on-one, citizen against citizen.
As a result, "English common law did not make the sharp division between civil wrongs and criminal wrongs."21 Conversely, in America, criminal law is said to be public law where society punishes an actor while
civil law is (generally) private law between two equal citizens. 22 For the

15. Oneby, 92 Eng. Rep. at 474; 2 Ld. Raym at 1499.
16. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701 (1975).
17. Id. at 694.
18.

1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 245 (1883); see also

Randall McGowen, New Directions and Old Debates in the History of the English Criminal
Law; Policing and Prosecutionin Britain 1750-1850, 43 STAN. L. REV. 799 (1991).
19. Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor in Historical Context, PROSECUTOR,
Mar./Apr. 2005, at 34, 37. Later authors have narrowed this generalization slightly by
showing certain quasi-public actors in various English agencies that would prosecute
crimes. See Bruce P. Smith, English Criminal JusticeAdministration, 1650-1850: A HistoriographicEssay, 25 L. & HIST. REV. 593, 621 (2007); Bruce P. Smith, The Emergence of
Public Prosecutionin London, 1790-1850, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 29, 62 (2006) ("By resorting to summary proceedings that eased detection, aided apprehension, spurred the initiation of cases, bypassed juries, and required suspects to 'explain away' their guilt, the English state developed a system of prosecution that addressed these defects and, more
strikingly, dispensed with private victims as well.").
20. Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the ProsecutorialProcess, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 357, 360 (1986).
21. Jacoby, supra note 19, at 37.
22. See, e.g., Ronald J. Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to Punish:A FurtherExploration
of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 301 (1990).
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former, we guard against the awesome power of the state with the presumption of innocence, the right against self-incrimination, the right to
confront your accusers, and the requirement that the state make its case
beyond a reasonable doubt. For the latter, the parties' parity obviates
such thumbing the scales: we presume a fair fight.
Since the parties enjoy equal footing in civil cases, we can shift burdens based on practical considerations like who has the better access to
the evidence. In criminal cases, on the other hand, principle does not always yield to practicality. In Mullaney,23 for example, the Supreme Court
explained "although intent is typically considered a fact peculiarly within
the knowledge of the defendant, this does not, as the Court has long recognized, justify shifting the burden to him." 24 Unlike early English
courts, then, we ought to have a different criterion when considering
whether to shift the burden of persuasion onto criminal defendants.
Conformity with historical practice is a poor candidate for such a criterion since it is neither inherently good nor bad. As the foregoing suggests, context matters. We cannot simply excise a quote from Blackstone
without considering what prompted it and how it fits into our modern
conception of criminal due process. As one scholar explains, "criminal defendants in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries did not
benefit from a presumption of innocence but, rather, struggled against a
statutory presumption of guilt." 25 Thus, clinging to Oneby's Rule just because it represents the common law is no answer to our current conundrum.
II. INSANITY CREATES UNCERTAINTY AND GEORGIA FINDS A SAFE HARBOR

Insanity complicates Blackstone's categorical rule and altered the
landscape for affirmative defenses in America. Originally handled in a
separate proceeding than the trial and, later, alternating between a defense and an element, insanity opened the door for the affirmative defense challenges in the 1970s. In this time of uncertainty, Georgia played
it safe by requiring the state to disprove all affirmative defenses.
Insanity is, of course, a very old concept that appears in several foundational religious and philosophical texts. The Talmud, for example,
26
states that "[n]o person sins until a spirit of insanity enters him." Likewise, Christians recognize several passages relating to insanity in the

23. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
24. Id. at 702.
25. Bruce P. Smith, The Presumptionof Guilt and the English Law of Theft, 1750-1850,
23 L. & HIST. REV. 133, 135 (2005) (emphasis omitted).
26. Talmud (Sota 3a).
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Bible. 27 Plato, in his ideal society, would have limited punishment for the
insane. 28 Shakespeare's frequent depictions of the mad or those feigning
madness have inspired spirited debate for centuries.29
Later, the Justinian Code distinguished between the sane and insane.
And, if found, insanity was a complete defense, in both criminal and tort
law, under Roman law. 30

Early English law followed this Roman idea of insanity as a complete
"defense," though generally not at trial. Originally, English law required
convictions of the insane who would then make a plea for pardon to the
King, who frequently obliged. 31 Thus, insanity was a "tool for pardon"
rather than a defense. 32
Under the rule of Edward 1 (1272-1307 C.E.), "complete madness" became a defense that a defendant could use at trial, though the first acquittal of record was centuries later in 1505.33 The standard for the de-

fense, which became insanity, transitioned from a (1) (doubtless
religiously inspired) ability to tell right from wrong to the (2) "wild beast"
test to a (3) short-lived control test before settling on the popular (4)
M'Naghten test in the middle of the nineteenth century.34

27. E.g., 1 Samuel 21:12-13 (New Int'l Ed.) (describing David feigning insanity, presumably to excuse bad behavior); Deuteronomy 28:15, 27-30 ("The Lord will afflict you with
madness, blindness and confusion of the mind. At midday you will grope about like a blind
man in the dark.").
28. THE LAWS OF PLATO 258 (Thomas L. Pangle, trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1980)
(limiting punishment of those in "state of madness," extreme old age, or infancy to restitution, except if the crime resulted in death, in which case the party would also be banished
for a year).
29.

DUNCAN SALKELD, MADNESS AND DRAMA IN THE AGE OF SHAKESPEARE 11 (1993)

&

(setting up his analysis of the madness in Shakespeare by noting the topic of madness in
Shakespeare's plays began in the late seventeenth century).
30. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN bk. 48, tit. 8.2 (Theodor Mommsen et al. eds., Univ. of
Penn. Press 1985) (n.d.). No test determined whether one was sane, nor is it clear whether
the defendant shouldered the burden of such a defense. See generally Eugene R. Milhizer,
Justificationand Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and What They Ought to Be, 78
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 725, 760 (2004) (explaining Roman juries were not instructed on the law
and their decisions were not reviewable).
31. Richard Moran, The Origin of Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trialfor Treason
of James Hadfield (1800), 19 L. & Soc'Y REV. 487 n.1 (1985).
32. R. Michael Shoptaw, M'Naghten Is a FundamentalRight: Why Abolishing the Traditional Insanity Defense Violates Due Process, 84 MISS. L.J. 1101, 1106 (2015) (internal
citation omitted).
33. Anne C. Gresham, The Insanity Plea: A Futile Defense for Serial Killers, 17 L.
PSYCHOL. REV. 193, 194 (1993).

34. Shoptaw, supra note 32, at 1106-07; Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond
Diminished Capacity:Mental Illness and Criminal Excuse in the Post-ClarkEra, 18 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 7, 14-15 (2007); Jodie English, The Light Between Twilight and Dusk:
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Culpability sits behind each of the formulations: the English system
35
did not want to punish those who were not morally blameworthy. Be
they "wild beasts" or simply "incapable of telling right from wrong," some
people were found not to have sufficient mental capacity to punish. 36
Following English common law, American jurisprudence recognized
an insanity defense. Determining who was insane was not necessarily an
easy task, complicated further by the professionalization of the sciences
37
and the concomitant rise of the experts.
38
This difficulty led the U.S. Supreme Court, in Davis v. United States,
to decide that the government should be required to prove sanity because
the absence of sanity tended to disprove the mens rea element of the offense charged. 39 In reversing the lower court on this ground, the Supreme
Court contravened Blackstone's categorical rule by reference to a larger
40
principle found in Blackstone's Commentaries.
Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan began by acknowledging English
common law precedent that established the defendant bore the burden of

Federal Criminal Law and the Volitional Insanity Defense, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 14-17
(1988).
35. English, supranote 34, at 13 ("Some British commentators, such as Hale, Hawkins,
and Blackstone, viewed volitional capacity as the linchpin of criminal responsibility.").
36. Moran, The Origin of Insanity, supra note 31, at 500.
37. See generally S.E. Shortt, Physicians, Science, and Status: Issues in the Professionalization of Anglo-American Medicine in the Nineteenth Century, 27 MED. HIST. 51, 68
(1983) (concluding that by the end of the end of the nineteenth century, "physicians had
become the personification of omniscient science."); JOHN CROMBY, ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY,
MENTAL HEALTH, AND DISTRESS 30-31 (2013) (discussing the "medicalization of madness");
see also Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1895) ("It seems to us that undue
stress is placed in some of the cases upon the fact that, in prosecutions for murder the
defense of insanity is frequently resorted to and is sustained by the evidence of ingenious
experts whose theories are difficult to be met and overcome.").
38. 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
39. Id. at 485. The court's reasoning was cabined by subsequent Supreme Court cases
and the ruling was superseded by statute. Id.
40. Again, as described in Part One, some historical sources are so vast that they can
be marshalled for directly opposing viewpoints. This does not imply that one side is misreading Blackstone. Instead, it is a recognition that the issue of burden shifting is actually
broader than a mere procedural question and, instead, touches areas of broader interest,
such as culpability and fairness. When addressing such issues of perennial concern, history
is a nice way of situating an argument. On the other hand, when we try to avoid the argument altogether by way of history, something else is going on. See, e.g., JACK RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION xv (1996)

("I happen to like originalist arguments when the weight of the evidence seems to support
the constitutional outcomes I favor-and that may be as good a clue to the appeal of
originalism as any other.").

42

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

establishing insanity. 41 He then proceeded through more recent cases in
England and America before invoking Blackstone's requirements for all
crimes, an actus reus and a mens rea:
[T]o make a complete crime cognizable by human laws, there must be
both a will and an act'; and 'as a vicious will without a vicious act is no
civil crime, so, on the other hand, an unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no crime at all. So that to constitute a crime against human laws, there must be, first, a vicious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will. 42

Without the capacity for vicious will, there could be no criminal responsibility. 43 An insanity defense, then, denied a core requirement of the
state's case and was therefore unlike a civil affirmative defense or a criminal "confession and avoidance" type plea.4 4 As it questioned the requisite

mens rea component, the State bore the burden of proving sanity beyond
all reasonable doubt. In sum, by recasting a defense as an element of an
offense, Blackstone's categorical rule was seemingly trumped by his
broader criminal law principles. 45
More broadly, Davis blurred the bright line between "elements of the
offense" and "defenses." Could it not be said that the two are often merely
opposite sides of the same coin? And that being the case, if the defendant
is forced to prove defenses, have we not simply excused the government
from proving all of the elements of the offense?
Yes, the Supreme Court announced in In re Winship46 that it is possible. The State must prove every essential element of an offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, and state law cannot either presume away an element,

41. Davis, 160 U.S. at 479; Regina v. Layton, 4 Cox, Cr. Cas. 149, 155 (which noted
that the defendant shouldering the burden for an insanity defense was a "cardinal rule.").
42. Davis, 160 U.S. at 484 (internal citation omitted).
43. Id. at 485.
44. Id. at 485-86 ('The plea of not guilty is unlike a special plea in a civil action, which,
admitting the case averred, seeks to establish substantive ground of defence by a preponderance of evidence. It is not in confession and avoidance, for it is a plea that controverts
the existence of every fact essential to constitute the crime charged. Upon that plea the
accused may stand, shielded by the presumption of his innocence, until it appears that he
is guilty; and his guilt cannot in the very nature of things be regarded as proved, if the jury
entertain a reasonable doubt from all the evidence whether he was legally capable of committing crime.").
45. Safe to assume that Blackstone would have been okay with the result, though. See
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND - PUBLIC WRONGS ch.2,

at 24 (1769) ("[I]diots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed when
under these incapacities: no, not even for treason itself.").
46. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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47
or shift the burden to the defendant. The Court extended this rule in
1975 by holding that Maine couldn't presume that malice existed in all
homicides. 4 8 These cases created uncertainty. Applying the Davis logic,
courts recognized that the distinction between elements and defenses
was not clean; in fact, the distinction was rather easily manipulated.
It was in this context that Georgia came to question when, if ever, it
would be appropriate for the defendant to shoulder the burden of proving
an affirmative defense. Unsure where the Supreme Court was going in
this area, the Georgia Supreme Court apparently decided to take the safest route: a Georgia defendant would never have to prove an affirmative
defense. The State would have to disprove any defenses raised by the
evidence. Thus, in State v. Moore,49 the court, with little express analysis
but acknowledging its divergence from the common law, held that Georgia juries should never be instructed that the defense has any burden of
proof.50
In announcing the rule that the State would maintain the burden of
persuasion on all affirmative defenses, the court dwelt on practical considerations. The State maintained the burden was a simple, uniform rule
51
that "would lessen the possibility of error." The burden-shifting rule, on
the contrary, is "of doubtful value, probably makes overly nice legal distinctions which are difficult for many juries to follow, and so far as can
be discerned has little, if any, influence upon verdicts reached in particular criminal cases." 52

III. SETTLED LAW (AND ALTERNATIVES TO GEORGIA'S MINORITY
APPROACH)

Perhaps inevitably, federal clarification began the next year. "Proof of
the non-existence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitution53
ally required," the U.S. Supreme Court held. Due process prohibits burden shifting only "when an affirmative defense does negate an element of
the crime." 54 Thus, proof of defenses that don't controvert any element of
the offense, but merely excuse the defendant's conduct, might still be allocated to the defendant. For instance, a federal defendant must prove a

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 364.
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 684.
237 Ga. 269, 227 S.E.2d 241 (1976).
Id. at 270, 227 S.E.2d at 242.

51. Id.

52. Id.
53. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).

54. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 237 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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defense of necessity.5 5 Likewise, a federal defendant claiming duress
must carry that burden.56
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principal unanimously.57

Charged with conspiracy to traffic in drugs and related offenses, Smith,
the federal defendant, contended he had withdrawn from the conspiracy,
and that all of his actions in furtherance of the conspiracy pre-dated the
statute of limitations. He argued the government must prove his active
participation in the conspiracy during the limitation period.5 8 The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court: the burden of proof as to both
withdrawal and statute of limitations was on the defendant.
"Establishing individual withdrawal was a burden that rested firmly
on the defendant regardless of when the purported withdrawal took
place," the Court explains because "[a]llocating to a defendant the burden
of proving withdrawal does not violate the Due Process Clause."59 This
was particularly true for the defense of withdrawal as it could not possibly negate an element and, instead, required a defendant to first admit
guilt. And this guilt remains even if Smith could successfully prove withdrawal.60
On the other hand, the statute of limitations argument may provide a
complete defense, but, nevertheless, it "is not necessarily one that establishes the defendant's innocence."61 The legislature's policy decision of a
time period after which cases would be unsuited for prosecution did not
address the criminality of the underlying action. Therefore, the defendant maintained the burden of proof, as with all other affirmative defenses
that do not negate an element of the offense. Put differently, "although
union of withdrawal with a statute-of-limitations defense can free the
defendant of criminal liability, it does not place upon the prosecution a
constitutional responsibility to prove that he did not withdraw." 62
In sum, Smith reiterates that burden shifting (so long as it does not
touch the government's burden on the elements of the offense) is completely kosher under federal law. Despite this clear principle, Georgia
jurisprudence has remained in its safe harbor, with the lone exception of,
oddly enough, the insanity defense.

55. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1980).
56. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006).
57. Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714 (2013).
58. Id. at 718.
59. Id. at 719 (emphasis omitted).
60. Id. ('Withdrawal terminates the defendant's liability for postwithdrawal acts of his
co-conspirators, but he remains guilty of conspiracy.").
61. Id. at 720.
62. Id.
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Georgia, like most states, now assigns the burden of persuasion for an
insanity defense to the defendant. 63 Insanity has developed separately
from the other affirmative defenses because popular cases, starting even
before M'Naghten6 4 and including John Hinkley's acquittal following his
assassination attempt on President Reagan, capture the public's attention, bringing about changes in the law.6 5 For the remainder of the article, we will focus on other affirmative defenses.
In Georgia, outside of insanity, the prosecutor always bears the burden
on affirmative defenses. Whether the defense negates an element of the
offense, or merely excuses it, the burden remains on the State to disprove
66
it beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, whether the defense is duress,
67
withdrawal from conspiracy, or expiration of the statute of limitations, 68 the entire burden lies with the State. So, too, for defenses such as
entrapment;6 9 justification; 70 coercion;7 1 parental consent to underage alcohol possession; 72 and, after the defendant meets a heightened burden
of production, involuntary intoxication 73 - the defense merely has to raise
an inference from the evidence to place the burden of (dis)proof on the
state.

63. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-2 to -3 (2011); Durrence v. State, 287 Ga. 213, 215, 695 S.E.2d
227, 229 (2010) (stating that a defendant has the burden to rebut the statutory presumption
of sanity by a preponderance of the evidence). For the laws of other states, see Shoptaw,
supra note 32, at 1105 (stating "five states have eliminated or effectively eliminated the
traditional insanity defense, thus preventing a criminal defendant from using his mental
condition as an affirmative defense for the crime with which he is charged. Though other
states have limited the defense and had such limitations held as constitutionally permissible, none except Idaho, Utah, Montana, Kansas, and Alaska have abolished the insanity
defense altogether."). For a slightly dated allocation of burdens in insanity cases, see
http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-procedure/the-insanity-defense-among-thestates.html (last visited July 28, 2016).
64. M'Naghten's Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718.
65. See Jessica Harrison, Idaho's Abolition of the Insanity Defense-an Ineffective,
Costly, and UnconstitutionalEradication,51 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 581-85 (2015).
66. Graham v. State, 239 Ga. App. 429, 432, 521 S.E.2d 249, 252 (1999).
67. Bailey v. State, 291 Ga. 144, 147, 728 S.E.2d 214, 216 (2012).
68. Adams v. State, 288 Ga. 695, 697, 707 S.E.2d 359, 362 (2011).
69. Hill v. State, 261 Ga. 377, 405 S.E.2d 258 (1991).
70. Taylor v. State, 231 Ga. App. 73, 498 S.E.2d 552 (1998).
71. Bailey v. State, 245 Ga. App. 852, 853, 539 S.E.2d 191, 192 (2000).
72. Burchett v. State, 283 Ga. App. 271, 273, 641 S.E.2d 262, 264 (2007) (holding that
the defendant did not meet his burden of production on the affirmative defense and therefore the state's burden to disprove was not triggered).
73. Stewart v. State, 291 Ga. App. 846, 847, 663 S.E.2d 278, 280 (2008) (treating intoxication as a diminished capacity case where Defendant must rebut the presumption of sanity by a preponderance of evidence before shifting the burden to the state, who must disprove involuntary intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt).
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Of course, while the Due Process Clause does not require that the burden of proof on affirmative defenses be placed with the government, it
does not forbid that practice either. The states and the federal government are always free to grant citizens more rights than the constitutional
minimum. But the Georgia Supreme Court, in Moore, did not claim that
either the Georgia Constitution, or Georgia statutory law, required such
a shift from the established common law.
So how have other states dealt with this issue? The Appendix to this
Article provides (an admittedly incomplete, though hopefully helpful)
comparison of the various approaches. As the appendix shows, most
states, at least occasionally, shift the burden of persuasion for affirmative
defenses to a criminal defendant.
Some states do so cleanly by statute. Arizona, for example, displaced
the common law by stating all defenses would be found in the statutes
and defendants would be required to establish the defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. 74 Other states do so by caselaw. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court explained the state's tripartite approach.7 5 Maine
recognized three types of defenses: (1) affirmative defenses that were defined by statute and for which defendant bore the burden of production
and persuasion; (2) justification defenses also defined by statute for
which defendant bore only the burden of production, and, most commonly; (3) failure of proof defenses which were evidentiary arguments
that did not involve burden shifting.7 6 Cleanly divided and grounded in
the common law, Maine provides a sensible, administrable rule.
Still other states set a default rule where the defendant only has the
burden of production, and leave the door open for statutory shifts on the
burden of persuasion.77 Whatever the approach, the majority of states
follow the federal rule and shift the burden of persuasion.
Georgia is one of thirteen states that does not do so. 7 8 In this group too
there are clear articulations by statute: "If the issue involved in an affirmative defense, other than insanity, is raised then the State must sustain the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt as to that issue."79 And also by caselaw: "Wisconsin law, independent of the federal due process requirements, requires the state to bear

ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-103, 13-205(A) (2005).
State v. Jaime, 111 A.3d 1050, 1057-58 (Me. 2015).
Id.
E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-13; State v. Edwards, 837 N.W.2d 81, 90 (Neb. 2013).
See Appendix and note the caveat.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-2 (b).
.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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the burden of disproving the asserted defense beyond a reasonable
doubt."80

Other states provide more muddled explanations. For example, New
Mexico distinguishes between regular and affirmative defenses, yet the
state ostensibly bears the burden of persuasion for each.81
While Georgia's law is clearer than New Mexico's law; its grounding
principle is now obsolete. In the face of an approaching storm, the Georgia Supreme Court understandably took shelter in a safe harbor. But
with the storm long past, that shelter is no longer needed and the Court
needs to reevaluate the set of the sails.
In this reevaluation, the distribution of the burden of proof needs to be
clear and easy to administer (that is, courts and lawyers should have no
trouble understanding who has the burden on what issues); it should
comport with due process (requiring the State to prove the elements of
the offense); and it should promote just outcomes.
The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that apportioning the burden
of proof on affirmative defenses to the defendant does not offend due process; and a majority of jurisdictions have concluded that doing so is more
just than requiring the State to disprove a defense merely suggested by
the defendant.
Perhaps Georgia is of a mind that its citizens deserve even greater
protections than those afforded by the U.S. Constitution, that the power
of the State is so overwhelming that it should shoulder every burden
other than proving sanity, and that the State is therefore willing to pay
the "social cost" of that decision: "an increased risk that the guilty will go
free." 82 If So, then our Supreme Court should clearly say so, and embrace

80. State v. Schleusner, 454 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
81. Compare State v. Parrish, 878 P.2d 988, 994 (N.M. 1994) ("[Iln New Mexico, selfdefense is not an affirmative defense. The burden of proof is on the state.") and State v.
Lefevre, 117 P.3d 980, 984 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (holding the state must disprove existence
of parental privilege beyond a reasonable doubt) with State v. Carrillo, 460 P.2d 62, 63
(N.M. Ct. App. 1969) ("Entrapment is an affirmative defense. This defense does not, however, shift the burden of proof to the accused.").
82. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 208. Courts in other states have relied on this reasoning and
its implicit separation of powers logic. The idea is that state legislatures have wide latitude
when defining criminal offenses and that due process requirements, though an ever-present
floor, are not an insurmountable barrier for legislatures trying to capture new offenses. See,
e.g., State v. Clausen, 493 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Minn. 1992) (noting that the court was "ordinarily loathe to intrude or even inquire into the legislative process on matters of criminal
punishment" and citing Pattersonto deny the defendant's constitutional challenge to a state
drug possession law) (internal citation and quotation omitted); State v. Coleman, 605 P.2d
1000, 1055 (Mont. 1979) (citing Patterson for the proposition that "Montana has the right
and authority to define crimes and their elements."); State v. Jenkins, 679 A.2d 3, 5 (Conn.
App. 1996) (citing Patterson while upholding a state statute that required defendant to

48

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

the Moore rule as an extra prophylactic around the dearly held presumption of innocence. 83 There are plenty of commentators who offer support
for this position. 84
If that is not the policy choice intended by the Court, then Georgia
should join the majority of states and most federal courts, and consider
that allocating the burden to the party with the superior access to the
evidence is a sensible division of labor. Thus, it would be rare that the
party with the burden of production would not also have the burden of
persuasion on the particular point.85

prove drug dependency by preponderance of evidence because the statute was the legislature's recognition of how difficult it would be to prove the absence of drug dependency);
Commonwealth v. McFarland, 382 A.2d 465, 470 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) ("Under Patterson,
a state is free to recognize a mitigating or exculpatory circumstance without being required
to prove the nonexistence of that circumstance if in the state's judgment such proof would
be too cumbersome, expensive and inaccurate.") (emphasis omitted).
83. The notion that the Georgia Constitution provides greater protection with regard
to burdens of proof than the U.S. Constitution does not comport with the fact that Georgia,
alone among all states, requires the highest burden of proof for a defendant claiming to be
mentally incompetent. See O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131 (2013); Stripling v. State, 289 Ga. 370, 377,
711 S.E.2d 665, 671 (2011) (Benham, J., dissenting); Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 260-63, 587
S.E.2d 613, 620-22 (2003). Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (stating
"we leave to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional
restriction upon [their] execution of sentences" (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
416-17 (1986)).
84. Professor George Fletcher was a strong advocate for this view and believed that the
trajectory of American justice was heading to the anti-burden shifting camp. For him, this
was a happy result. See Fletcher, supranote 12, at 929 ("Whether the fear of acquitting the
guilty justifies that risk depends on the strength of the concern for justice to the individual.
It depends, in short, on how earnestly one subscribes to the postulate that the morally
guilty, and only they, may justly be punished under the criminal law."). In a strange twist,
Professor Fletcher's article was cited in Dixon, where the Supreme Court affirmed the use
of burden shifting for a defense of duress. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 8.
More generally, there is no shortage of academic commentary critical of criminal defendants' procedural disadvantages. See, e.g., Ion Meyn, The UnbearableLightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39, 87 (2014) ("For those who are wrongfully accused,
pretrial procedures currently in place rarely permit an adequate defense. The criminal
model's failure to integrate due process features into the pretrial process increases the risk
of wrongful convictions. The current criminal pretrial procedures resist factual development and judicial efforts to ensure integrity of the record. Trial does not cleanse the system
of these defects for the innocent defendant. The prosecution's asymmetrical control of pretrial information significantly impedes the ability of a defendant to provide a counter-narrative at trial, and the quality of the pretrial process in securing relevant information cannot be divorced from the trial moment.").
85. Accord Dixon, 548 U.S. at 8; but see 2 J.STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337
(7th ed. 2013) ("A doctrine often repeated by the courts is that where the facts with regard
to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of a party, that party has the burden of proving
the issue. . . . This consideration should not be overemphasized. Very often one must plead
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Our adherence to Moore continues without, as is usually required
when contravening a well-established common law rule, express statutory command.8 6 Though Georgia's statutory scheme separates defenses
into three articles (responsibility, justification and excuse, and alibi), the
distinction in burden shifting between these articles is driven by caselaw
and not statute.87
In sum, the Georgia Supreme Court can adopt a perfectly sound rationale for allocating all burdens (other than insanity) to the State, or it
can rejoin the majority of jurisdictions and allocate those burdens. To this
point, it has done neither, and has simply adopted a rule with a reason
that no longer exists. We encourage the court to examine the alternatives
and enunciate a rule and a rationale which accords with due process,
provides clear guidance to bench and bar, and promotes just outcomes.

and prove matters as to which his adversary has superior access to the proof."); Dixon, 548
U.S. at 27 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[W]hile I concede the logic of the Government's practical
argument-that defendants have superior access to the evidence-I remain uncertain of
the argument's strength. After all, '[i]n every criminal case the defendant has at least an
equal familiarity with the facts and in most a greater familiarity with them than the prosecution.' And the strict contours of the duress defense, as well as the defendant's burden of
production, already substantially narrow the circumstances under which the defense may
be used.") (internal citation omitted).
86. Accord Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Townsend, 279 Ga. 511, 512, 614 S.E.2d 745, 747-48
(2005) ("[I]t has always been a rule of construction of statutes that those in derogation of
the common law, that is those which give rights not had under the common law, ... must
be limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed, and not extended beyond the
plain and explicit terms of the statute. The legislature is presumed to act with knowledge
of this rule of construction, and with that body only lies the right and privilege to grant
rights not given under the common law and to extend and broaden any rights so granted.
Such is not the function of the courts.") (internal citation omitted)
87. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-1 (2011 & Supp. 2016) to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-40 (2011 & Supp. 2016);
see also Hightower v. State, 224 Ga. App. 703, 704-05, 481 S.E.2d 867, 869 (1997)) ("An alibi
defense creates a reasonable doubt on behalf of the accused, and the state has the risk of
failure to carry the burden of persuasion and, as a consequence, may fail to carry the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."); Parham v. State, 120 Ga. App. 723, 727, 171
S.E.2d 911, 914 (1969) ("Alibi is not truly an independent affirmative defense. It is simply
evidence in support of a defendant's plea of not guilty, and should be treated merely as
evidence tending to disprove one of the essential factors in the case of the prosecution, that
is, presence of the defendant at the time and place of the alleged crime.") (internal quotation
and citation omitted).
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Appendix: Burdens for Affirmative Defenses in the Other States
Note: These categoriesare not terribly neat, as many states have a general
rule with exceptions or outlier cases or statutes. Likewise, the citations do
not aim to be exhaustive as the nuances of each state's laws are beyond the
scope of our inquiry. Nevertheless, we found the categories helpful as a
general guide to compare the approaches of other states. So, while not definitive, we hope the exhibit provides a useful jumping off point.

I. STATES SHIFTING THE BURDEN TO THE DEFENDANT BY STATUTE

Alaska: ALASKA STAT.

§ 11.81.900(b)(2).

Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-103 (abolishing common law affirmative
defenses and stating all affirmative defenses shall be established by stat-

§ 13-205(A)

ute); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

("a defendant shall prove any af-

firmative defense raised by a preponderance of the evidence.").
Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN.

§ 5-1-111(d).

Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 53a-12(b).

Delaware: DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 11,

Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT.

§ 304(a).

§ 701-115.

Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.070(3). Defendants in Kentucky
do not often have the burden, but the statutory framework allows the
legislature to specify when defendants may prove matters "in exculpation." See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 520.070(2) ("In any prosecution for
bail jumping, the defendant may prove in exculpation that his failure to
appear was unavoidable and due to circumstances beyond his control.").

Maine: ME. STAT. tit. 17-A,
Missouri: Mo. REV. STAT.

§ 101(2).

§ 556.051.

New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 626:7(b).

New Jersey: Generally, a defendant has only the burden of production.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-13 (State maintains burden unless statute indi-
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cates otherwise). But, in some cases, defendant also has burden of persuasion. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12 (defendant must establish entrapment
by a preponderance); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6(e)(3) (same for abandonment of conspiracy); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-1(e) (providing a necessity
affirmative defense to kidnapping that a defendant must establish by
clear and convincing evidence).

New York: N.Y. PENAL LAW

§ 25.00(2).

North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE

§ 12.1-01-03(3).

Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A).
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.055.
Pennsylvania: 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 313(b) (defendant has burden to
prove entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence).
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-204.
Texas: TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.04.

II. STATES SHIFTING THE BURDEN TO THE DEFENDANT BY COMBINATION

OF CASELAW AND STATUTE

California: People v. Sherow, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1296, 1307 (2011) ("[A]
preponderance of the evidence standard is applicable to defenses asserted
by an accused which raise factual issues collateral to the question of the
accused's guilt or innocence and do not bear directly on any link in the
chain of proof of any element of the crime.") (internal punctuation and
citations omitted); People v. Fuentes, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1041, 1045 (1990)
("It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in
unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the
exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant.").
Florida: FLA. STAT. § 777.201 (placing burden of persuasion on the defendant for crime of entrapment); Miller v. State, 35 So. 3d 162, 163 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) ("the defendant may raise by affirmative defense the
claim that he did not know the substance was cocaine.").
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Indiana: Brown v. State, 485 N.E.2d 108, 111 (Ind. 1985) ("While a criminal defendant has the constitutional right not to testify at trial, the defendant has the burden of proof on any affirmative defense."); Satterfield
v. State, 468 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (noting insanity, entrapment, and intoxication are all affirmative defenses for which the defendant bears the burden).
Iowa: State v. Wilt, 333 N.W.2d 457, 462 (Iowa 1983) (noting defendant
has only the burden of production for entrapment, prescription for drugs,
and self-defense defenses). But see State v. Baker, 66 N.W.2d 303, 311
(Iowa 1954) (noting that alibi is an affirmative defense that defendant
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence) (has not been expressly overruled).
Louisiana: State v. Washington, 168 So. 3d 746, 751 (La. Ct. App. 2015)
writ denied, 184 So. 3d 704 (La. 2016), and cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2417
(2016) (noting that state keeps burden of persuasion for self-defense or
defense of property claims in homicide but the defendant bears the burden in non-homicide cases); State v. Morrison, 55 So. 3d 856, 864 (La. Ct.
App. 2010) ("The defense of justification is an affirmative defense that
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.").
Maryland: Herd v. State, 724 A.2d 693, 702 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999)
("With respect to such an affirmative defense, there is allocated to the
defendant both 1) the burden of initial production and 2) the burden of
ultimate persuasion.").
Michigan: People v. Vansickle, 842 N.W.2d 289, 293 (Mich. Ct. App.
2013) (defendant has burden to establish entrapment by a preponderance
of the evidence); People v. Akins, 675 N.W.2d 863, 873 (Mich. Ct. App.
2003) (defendant must establish abandonment by preponderance of the
evidence).
Minnesota: State v. Hage, 595 N.W.2d 200, 207 (Minn. 1999) (finding no
error in allocating burden of persuasion to the defendant on the defense
of necessity).
Mississippi: MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-1-25 (defendant has burden for entrapment by clear and convincing evidence); Davis v. State, 158 So. 3d
1190, 1195 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) ("[U]nlike the burden of self-defense,
the burden of proving the affirmative defense of necessity falls on the
defendant.").
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Montana: State v. Reynolds, 104 P.3d 1056, 1057 (Mont. 2004) (defendant bears the burden of persuasion for entrapment).
Nebraska: State v. Edwards, 837 N.W.2d 81, 90 (Neb. 2013) (announcing default rule that, unless burden specified by statute, defendant bore
burden of production and state maintained burden of persuasion). See
also NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-202 (allowing defendant to prove entrapment
as affirmative defense to conspiracy charge).
Nevada: Jorgensen v. State, 688 P.2d 308, 310 (Nev. 1984) (no error in
requiring defendant to prove defense of necessity). But see Corbin v.
State, 892 P.2d 580, 582 (Nev. 1995) (finding reversible error in shifting
burden of persuasion to defendant for entrapment defense).
North Carolina: State v. Caddell, 215 S.E.2d 348, 363 (N.C. 1975) (automatism is an affirmative defense that, if not stemming from state's
case, must be proved by defendant); State v. Hinkle, 659 S.E.2d 34, 38
(N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (statutory exceptions are affirmative defenses that
the defendant must prove).
Rhode Island: State v. Urena, 899 A.2d 1281, 1288 (R.I. 2006) (explaining that, unlike self-defense where a defendant only has the burden of
production, battered women's syndrome is an affirmative defense that
leaves a defendant with the burden of persuasion); State v. Latraverse,
443 A.2d 890, 896 (R.I. 1982) (noting a defendant must establish abandonment by a preponderance of the evidence).
South Carolina: State v. Cole, 403 S.E.2d 117, 119 (S.C. 1991) (defendant must establish necessity by a preponderance of the evidence); State
v. Hardy, 325 S.E.2d 320, 322 (S.C. 1985) (same for self-defense).
South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-5-1 ("No person may be convicted of a crime based upon conduct in which that person engaged because of the use or threatened use of unlawful force upon himself, herself,
or another person, which force or threatened use of force a reasonable
person in that situation would have been lawfully unable to resist.");
State v. Ducheneaux, 671 N.W.2d 841, 842 (S.D. 2003) (seemingly blending the burden of production and persuasion for the section 22-5-1 defense by giving the defendant the burden to raise a reasonable doubt).
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Vermont: State v. Baker, 579 A.2d 479, 483 (Vt. 1990) (detailing recent
shifts in Vermont's affirmative defense law and concluding that necessity, in addition to insanity and entrapment, must be established by defendant by a preponderance of the evidence).
Virginia: Riley v. Commonwealth, 675 S.E.2d 168, 175 (Va. 2009)
("When asserting an affirmative defense, such as insanity, self-defense,
or unconsciousness, the burden is on the defendant to present evidence
establishing such defense to the satisfaction of the fact finder."); Foley v.
Commonwealth, 755 S.E.2d 473, 481 (Va. Ct. App. 2014) ("[T]he determination of which party has the burden of persuasion turns on which affirmative defense is being asserted.").
Washington: State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 51 (Wash. 1994) ("Normally,
affirmative defenses must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.").

III. STATES THAT LEAVE THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION ON THE STATE

Alabama: Vaughn v. State, 304 So. 2d 6, 9 (Ala. 1974) ("we feel constrained, both upon principle and authority, to the conclusion that there
is no greater burden upon the accused to establish self-defense, by affirmative evidence, than any other defense; but, if all the evidence raises in
the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to whether he acted in selfdefense, the defendant should be acquitted.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 18-1-407.

Idaho: State v. Camp, 8 P.3d 657, 661, n.2 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000) (defendant has the burden of production for affirmative defenses which is established by meeting the prima facie case).
Illinois: 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-2(b) ("If the issue involved in an affirmative defense, other than insanity, is raised then the State must sustain the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt as to that issue together with all the other elements of the offense.
If the affirmative defense of insanity is raised, the defendant bears the
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence his insanity at the
time of the offense."); People v. Biers, 353 N.E.2d 389, 395 (Ill. App. Ct.
1976) ("The principle of an affirmative defense allows the defendant to
raise the issue when it might be applicable, however, and in such cases
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still requires the State to meet the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt as to that issue. The use of affirmative defenses is thus more a
matter of convenience than anything else and does not violate the defendant's right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.").
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5108(c) ("A defendant is entitled to an in-

struction on every affirmative defense that is supported by competent
evidence. Competent evidence is that which could allow a rational fact
finder to reasonably conclude that the defense applies. Once the defendant satisfies the burden of producing such evidence, the state has the
burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt."). Note, subsection (d) carves out territorial issues, double jeopardy, and statute of
limitations as non-affirmative defenses.
Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Cabral, 819 N.E.2d 951, 963 (Mass.
2005) (State must disprove properly raised affirmative defenses). See also
Commonwealth v. Podkowka, 840 N.E.2d 476, 482 (Mass. 2006) ("Accident, like provocation, self-defense, and defense of others, are treated as
if they are affirmative defenses, which, when they negate an essential
element of a crime (here, malice) must be disproved by the Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt.").
New Mexico: New Mexico seems to draw distinction between regular
and affirmative defenses. E.g., State v. Parrish,878 P.2d 988, 994 (N.M.
1994) ("[Ijn New Mexico, self-defense is not an affirmative defense. The
burden of proof is on the state."); State v. Lefevre, 117 P.3d 980, 984 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2005) (State must disprove existence of parental privilege beyond a reasonable doubt).Yet, even for affirmative defense, State maintains ultimate burden of persuasion (after the defendant meets burden
of production). E.g., State v. Carrillo,460 P.2d 62, 63 (N.M. Ct. App. 1969)
("Entrapment is an affirmative defense. This defense does not, however,
shift the burden of proof to the accused.").
Oklahoma: Hogan v. State, 139 P.3d 907, 924 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006)
("The burden of persuasion remains on the State to prove each element
of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt and thus to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt the absence of any affirmative defense raised.").
Utah: State v. Campos, 309 P.3d 1160, 1171 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) ("The
prosecution is required to disprove the existence of affirmative defenses
beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant has produced some evidence of the defense") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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West Virgina: State v. Cook, 515 S.E.2d 127, 136 (W. Va. 1999) (burden
of persuasion remains with State for defense of others, as with self-defense); State v. Hinkle, 489 S.E.2d 257, 263 (W. Va. 1996) (same for automatism); State v. Houston, 475 S.E.2d 307, 320 (W. Va. 1996) (and entrapment).
Wisconsin: State v. Schleusner, 454 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990)
("Wisconsin law, independent of the federal due process requirements,
requires the state to bear the burden of disproving the asserted defense
beyond a reasonable doubt.").
Wyoming: Bowlsby v. State, 302 P.3d 913, 924 (Wyo. 2013) ("Because
this is an affirmative defense, the defendant has the burden of producing
evidence to support it, and the prosecution then generally has the burden
to negate this defense beyond a reasonable doubt.").
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